William Rothman's Vertigo by Butler, Rex
Film-Philosophy 18 (2014): Special Section on Stanley Cavell 
www.film-philosophy.com 35 
William Rothman’s Vertigo 
Rex Butler1 
 
In his essay ‘Scottie’s Dream, Judy’s Plan, Madeleine’s Revenge’, William 
Rothman proposes an extraordinary new reading of Alfred Hitchcock’s 
Vertigo (1958), a film that not only has been subject to an almost 
overwhelming amount of interpretation but with its detective subplot has 
interpretation itself as one of its subjects (Groves 2011). It is a reading that 
overturns all previous interpretations of the film, both by him and others, 
and that Rothman compares to a number of readings of films, not unrelated 
to Vertigo: the suggestion that Uncle Charlie wants to be killed by his young 
namesake in Hitchcock’s Shadow of a Doubt (1943), put forward by 
Rothman in his Hitchcock – The Murderous Gaze (Rothman 1982, 241); 
and the suggestion that in the famous scene in King Vidor’s Stella Dallas 
(1937), in which Stella dresses inappropriately at the upmarket resort and 
drives away her daughter, she is aware of the effect of her actions, put 
forward by Stanley Cavell in Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama 
of the Unknown Woman (Cavell 1996, 201). 
But there are two notable features of his reading of Vertigo that Rothman 
makes a point of mentioning. The first is that it overturns not only others’ 
interpretations of the film but also his own. In his own earlier attempt to 
write on the film, ‘Vertigo: The Unknown Woman in Hitchcock’, Rothman 
admits, he did not see the possibility he now presently contemplates. Indeed, 
looking at the film today, it seems so obvious that he feels that something 
must have stopped him seeing it, as though (like the character Scottie in the 
film, as we will discover) he unconsciously repressed his knowledge of it or 
chose somehow not to believe it. It is almost as though his love for the 
character Judy blinded him to her, made him not want to think this thing 
about her, not want to think her capable of what he now knows she is.2 
And yet the second notable thing about Rothman’s reading – almost in 
contradiction with the first – is that, for all of its obviousness to him now, he 
states it only as a possibility, which he does not want definitively to displace 
the prevailing one of the scene in question.3 For all of Rothman’s conviction 
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2 Rothman writes: ‘In my wish to believe I knew what I did not know about Judy, about 
Vertigo, and in my wish to believe I did not know what I knew, I was Hitchcock’s made-to-
order witness. I was no different from Scottie in Hitchcock’s eyes’ (Rothman 2013). Note: 
because ‘Scottie’s Dream’ has not yet been published and I am working from a copy given 
to me by the author, I do not provide page numbers here or in further references to this text. 
3 Rothman writes: ‘I am not claiming that in the world of Vertigo the reality is that Judy is 
always acting. My claim is that Hitchcock constructs his film so that every moment sustains 
this as a possibility’ (Rothman 2013).  
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that he is right, he nevertheless admits that he cannot be certain that what he 
says of Judy is true, that there is no objective evidence for what he is saying, 
and that, paradoxically, it is perhaps even this uncertainty that allows him to 
put forward his own interpretation with all the more conviction. Here it is 
almost as though uncertainty and conviction cannot be separated, or as 
though the persuasiveness of what he is saying gains from its inability to be 
proved, if not its actual unlikelihood. 
What then is this new reading that Rothman proposes in ‘Scottie’s Dream’? 
What is this new feature he has noticed that makes him want to overturn not 
only others’ but even his own interpretation of the film? In a scene towards 
the end of Vertigo, after Scottie has successfully made Judy over into 
Madeleine, they are both in Judy’s hotel room, planning to go to dinner. 
They have just kissed and probably made love. After a discreet cut, we now 
see Judy sitting in a chair pinning her hair back and asking Scottie to help 
her put a jewelled necklace around her neck, as she cannot do it herself. It is 
at this moment that Scottie looks at the reflection of the necklace in the 
mirror and realises that it is the same one that Madeleine wore, based on a 
similar necklace worn in a painting of Carlotta Valdes, the woman with 
whom Madeleine was obsessed, which hangs in the Palace of the Legion of 
Honor. Putting all of the pieces together, Scottie realises that the woman 
before him is not just made up by him to look like Madeleine, but actually 
was Madeleine, and was involved in the murder of the real Madeleine, 
whom he now realises he has never seen, by her husband Gavin Elster. 
At this point, the mood of the film dramatically changes. Scottie does not 
respond to the now perfect Judy’s request to ‘muss me a little’, and turns 
down her request to dine at Ernie’s (already, it seems, their favourite 
restaurant, in honour of the memory – at least for Scottie – of the place 
where he first saw ‘Madeleine’). Instead, he says, when they are in the car, 
that there is ‘one final thing I have to do’. He then reprises the trip, taken 
earlier in the film when he attempted to overcome Madeleine’s obsession by 
showing her that the place that she dreamt of was real, but which was in fact 
where Elster’s plan to kill his wife reached its culmination, by returning 
with her to the Mission San Juan Bautista. Dragging her into the Mission 
belltower and up its stairs to the top, Scottie accuses Judy of being involved 
in the plot to kill Madeleine before kissing her and uttering ‘I loved you so’ 
as they both breathe heavily together in a tight embrace. But as Scottie holds 
Judy in his arms, a nun mysteriously appears behind him, attracted as she 
says by ‘voices’, and Judy, for some reason suddenly fearful, steps back and 
over the edge of the tower, thus replaying the fate of the ‘real’ Madeleine 
she impersonated and for whose murder Scottie was the ‘made-to-order’ 
witness. 
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Up until this point, Rothman suggests in his essay, critics following the 
sequence had invariably thought that Judy was simply making a mistake in 
allowing Scottie to put on a necklace that had originally belonged to 
Madeleine. After all, earlier in the film – in a famous directorial decision 
taken by Hitchcock against the protest of the scriptwriter – it was revealed 
to the audience via a letter Judy writes to Scottie that she was part of a plot 
to kill Madeleine. However, after contemplating confessing to him and then 
leaving, she rips the letter up and decides to stay and try to create a 
relationship with Scottie, with whom she had already fallen in love as 
Madeleine, but without telling him she was Madeleine. For, needless to say, 
if Scottie ever found out about her role in Madeleine’s murder, he would 
feel deeply betrayed and she would lose him and perhaps worse. And this 
has the effect that in an extraordinary and increasingly difficult to justify 
way – for some viewers of the film, it is an instance of female masochism 
for which Hitchcock should be criticised; for others, Scottie’s obsession is 
impossible to take seriously and frankly comedic – Judy is willing to be 
made over as another woman in order to keep the man she loves. 
Rothman, however, overturns all of this with the spectacular hypothesis that 
Judy deliberately chooses her necklace so that Scottie will know who she is. 
After all, suggests Rothman, it is Judy who from the beginning has sought 
Scottie out after Madeleine is killed. When he first sees her out on the street 
after the murder and she offers her distinctive profile both to the camera and 
to him, it is in front of the flower shop that Madeleine used to buy flowers 
from and where Judy might have guessed Scottie would spend time trying to 
hold on to his memories of the woman he lost.  Similarly, after Scottie sees 
Judy and she enters the Empire Hotel where she now lives, she opens her 
window out onto the street, so that he can tell which room she is staying in. 
(This is to replay that moment earlier in the film when Scottie is following 
Madeleine and she is seen through the window of the room in the 
McKittrick Hotel she has booked so that she can indulge her obsession with 
Carlotta.) And when Judy does show Scottie her jewels, Rothman goes on to 
argue, she wants to be recognised neither as the ‘idealised’ Madeleine 
whom he dresses her up as nor as the lower-class Judy whom he can dress 
up, but rather as the brilliant actress she must be in order to pass herself off 
as Madeleine and perhaps even as Judy – for, as Rothman speculates, what 
is to say that Judy really is whom she purports to be (and, arguably, her very 
ability to become Madeleine means that the Judy Scottie thinks he knows is 
not all that she actually is). 
Rothman, when he describes the new Judy he has discovered, cannot help 
but repeat in a way the reaction Scottie has when he finds out that she was 
involved in the plot to kill Madeleine. The reaction that Judy feared 
occurring if Scottie found out in that previous reading comes to pass too 
with Rothman. He realises that he never knew Judy, he laments in ‘Scottie’s 
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Dream’. There is something truly ‘unknowable’ about her, even though with 
his new hypothesis he presumes to know her all over again. In fact, it is 
almost as though he does not really want to know what she is so evidently 
telling him, and would disregard it if he could. We might even say of the 
response of Rothman in ‘Scottie’s Dream’ that it is like that of Scottie, who 
upon discovering that she is not whom he took her for does not directly 
confront her, as though there were some unbridgeable distance between 
them that could never be crossed. (And, indeed, Rothman actually does 
artificially maintain this distance in ‘Scottie’s Dream’, for, despite him 
claiming that he did not until now realise all this about Judy, in his original 
‘Vertigo: The Unknown Woman in Hitchcock,’ we can see him already 
there contemplating the possibility that Judy was deliberately showing 
Scottie her jewels.) (Rothman 2004, 230) 
From ‘Vertigo: The Unknown Woman in Hitchcock’ on, Rothman is thus 
explicitly aligning Vertigo with that genre originally identified by Cavell as 
the ‘melodramas of the unknown woman’.4 In that genre, as opposed to 
Cavell’s ‘comedies of remarriage’, in which men and women, if they do not 
ever entirely understand one another, nevertheless keep on conversing, there 
is a final lapse into scepticism and social isolation. What is admitted in the 
final unknowability of women to men is the fact that at no point is what the 
woman says to be taken literally, that there is always another possible 
meaning beneath the obvious. As Cavell writes in Contesting Tears: ‘Every 
single description of the self that is true is false, is in a word, or a name, 
ironic’ (Cavell 1996, 134-5). And yet women for their part are possessed of 
an ability to know about men, to discern their most private thoughts and 
desires, unknown perhaps even to themselves. Again as Cavell puts it: ‘In 
repeating the man’s words, she, as it were, studies each one of them as she 
delivers them back, rebuking him for each one’ (Cavell 1996, 130). And 
there is something of this in Rothman’s account of Judy in ‘Scottie’s 
Dream’. He acknowledges that she is unknown to him and that he could 
never know if she is being ironic, or whether there is something else being 
indicated by what she says or does. And yet at the same time Judy appears 
to know all about Rothman, or at least – despite everything he has said – he 
attempts to identify himself with her. So that not only is Hitchcock 
attempting to become something of an ‘unknown woman’ in his films, but 
so is Rothman through his attempt to account for them: 
                                                      
4 Rothman writes, for example, in ‘Scottie’s Dream’: ‘Insofar as she is an actress who has 
no identity separable from the roles she has made her own, how can [Judy] make Scottie 
love her – as she is, for herself – except by lying? Insofar as she knows that, as an actress, 
there is nothing she is – for herself – she possesses the knowledge possessed by the 
heroines of such unknown woman melodramas as Stella Dallas, Now Voyager and Letter 
from an Unknown Woman (all films intimately related to Vertigo)’ (Rothman 2013). 
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I was blind [to Hitchcock], but now I see, I wish to believe – and I do 
believe – [that I now know him] as I write these words… I did not 
even consider the possibility that the woman in Vertigo knew herself 
better than I knew her – and better than I knew myself (Rothman 
2013). 
In his essay ‘The Žižekian Thing: A Disciplinary Blind Spot’, Chris Dumas 
raises questions about the discourse that allows Rothman to speak of 
Hitchcock as an ‘unknown woman’ and in turn to identify with this 
‘unknown woman’. Indeed, although the essay is principally about Slavoj 
Žižek and the similar claims he makes about Hitchcock’s films, Dumas 
specifically mentions Rothman, to whose analyses Žižek admits his debt 
(Dumas 2011, 248). What both Žižek and Rothman share is the idea that 
Hitchcock’s films are somehow allegories of their own viewing; that when 
we watch them we become aware that we are watching ourselves watching 
them; that the fundamental subject of Hitchcock’s films is the apparatus of 
cinema itself. Thus, to take only the most obvious example, Rear Window 
(Alfred Hitchcock, 1954) is not about the voyeurism of its central 
characters, but about our voyeurism, the act of watching the film itself. And, 
in forcing us to confront this fact, there is for both Rothman and Žižek a 
certain critical potential to Hitchcock’s films: an acknowledgement that we 
are already in the scene; that the gaze of the camera (and of the various 
characters through the camera) that appears so far from us is in fact our 
own. As Žižek writes in ‘‘In His Bold Gaze My Ruin is Writ Large’’ in 
Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Lacan… But Were Afraid to 
Ask Hitchcock: ‘By means of a reflexive inclusion of his/her own gaze, the 
viewer becomes aware how this gaze of his/hers is always-already partial, 
‘ideological’, stigmatised by a ‘pathological’ desire’ (Žižek 1992, 225). And 
as Dumas helpfully elaborates: ‘Hitchcock tricks us by confronting us with 
our darkest desires – desires that he already knew were there – and, what’s 
more, he knows that he is doing it, and he knows that we don’t know he’s 
doing it’ (Dumas 2011, 253). 
The idea for Žižek, Dumas is suggesting, is that in making us see ourselves 
seeing, in revealing that the other in them is only ourselves, Hitchcock’s 
films allow us to break with our ideological construction. They force us to 
realise our own implication in what appears simply to be imposed on us 
from the outside. And in Rothman too there is the same distanciation or self-
reflection, although without the social and political consequences being 
drawn quite so overtly. The long narrative arc of Hitchcock – The 
Murderous Gaze traces the gradually diminishing gap between the audience, 
the actors and Hitchcock – from the noisy theatricality of such early films as 
The Thirty Nine Steps (Alfred Hitchcock, 1935), in which there remains a 
distance between the actors and us, a certain self-awareness that means they 
are always performing for the camera, to the hushed absorption of such 
films as Psycho (Alfred Hitchcock 1960), in which there is no distance 
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between Norman and us and he is at once unknowable and empty.5 And this 
becomes evident in the famous conclusion to Rothman’s book, in which he 
completely identifies with Hitchcock, acknowledging that he is as guilty as 
the characters in the films of the murders he witnesses, insofar as they have 
been staged for him by the director. 
But, Dumas goes on to ask, ‘What if [all this] weren’t true?’ (Dumas 2011, 
254) What if the ‘umbilical cord’ (Žižek 1992, 241) connecting what is on 
the screen to the viewer's gaze did not exist, so that we are forced when 
watching Hitchcock’s films to take into account our own unspoken desires? 
Or, to put it more concretely, what if Rear Window were not a film about 
cinema spectatorship but simply about the voyeurism of its principal 
characters? What if the real trajectory we should be tracing here is not from 
a specific voyeurism to a general spectatorship but from a general 
spectatorship to a specific voyeurism? ‘In other words, what if Rear 
Window is not a film about the cinema but merely a film about voyeurism?’ 
(Dumas 2011, 254) For why is it, Dumas asks, that Žižek (and Rothman) 
want to read this self-reflexivity into Hitchcock with no obvious evidence 
for it when what they are looking for is all the more evidenced in a director 
of whom they never speak and moreover of the type they are never likely 
to? What Dumas ultimately seeks to identify in his essay is a ‘blindness’ 
(Dumas 2011, 261) that makes possible the Žižekian system, an overlooking 
of evidence that is directly before him and that he either does not or refuses 
to see. 
The real subject of ‘The Žižekian Thing’ – exactly in the sense of that 
‘demark’ or exceptional element that allows a total referential system (Žižek 
means it to apply to the symbolic structure of the gaze, but Dumas means it 
to apply to the totalising logic of Žižek himself) (Dumas 2011, 250) – is the 
cinema of Brian De Palma. It is De Palma’s films that have all of the 
elements that Žižek attributes to Hitchcock: formal self-reflexivity, the 
allegorisation of the cinematic apparatus, the implication of the gaze of the 
spectator within the film. But precisely Žižek does not – and perhaps in 
some sense is unable to – admit this. For all of his talk of taking into 
account the gaze, of acknowledging that what we see before us is a 
reflection of our desire, he does not see it when it is before him in the form 
of De Palma’s films. He necessarily remains blind to it. It is what cannot be 
seen in order to allow Žižek to argue that it is in Hitchcock’s films that we 
are ‘compelled to assume the gaze’ (Žižek 1992, 223). (And we might say 
                                                      
5 In this regard, we might contrast our first sight of Robert Donat as Richard Hannay in The 
39 Steps, in which he is seen from behind with the collar of his coat turned up as he enters 
the music hall, to the close-ups from under his chin of Anthony Perkins as Norman as he 
talks to Marion in his parlour in Psycho. In the former, Hannay is already playing at being 
mysterious and alluring even though he is not looking at the camera. In the latter, Norman 
is rendered unrecognisable, even though the camera is extremely close to him. 
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something similar for Rothman, or at least Rothman repeats in many ways 
the same gesture of exclusion as Žižek. In his essay ‘Thoughts on 
Hitchcock’s Authorship’, written for the centenary of Hitchcock’s birth, 
Rothman refuses Gus Van Sant’s 1998 remake of Psycho, which for all of 
its faults does seem to embody Rothman’s argument for the identification 
with Hitchcock, the merging of the gaze of the director and the gaze of the 
spectator (Rothman 2004, 263). At least in part, Van Sant’s film can be read 
as an allegory of his desire, like Rothman, literally to become Hitchcock’s 
‘murderous gaze’). 
But, for all of Dumas’ arguably justified criticisms of Žižek (and Rothman) 
for not looking for evidence where it is most obviously to be found, what he 
does not reflect on is why they do not do this. What clues are there in their 
work that would allow us to think how they might respond to the kinds of 
objections he makes? (A blind spot, if we follow the logic of their work, is 
not only the limit or refutation of a symbolic system but also what means 
this system has no outside.) The only real explanation Dumas puts forward 
is that Žižek and Rothman do not like De Palma because, unlike Hitchcock, 
his films are ‘resistant to a certain kind of interpretive reading – the kind of 
depth reading that must perform a critical gesture on behalf of a film’ 
(Dumas 2011, 260). But what does this mean? What is at stake in this 
demand or necessity for the film not to do all of the interpretive work itself? 
Why, for all of Žižek’s and Rothmans’s arguments, whether with wider 
ideological implications or not, for the spectator to see their own gaze 
within the film, when this actually is the case do they avoid it or tend not to 
want it? What kind of limit or qualification to their argument do we see 
here? Or, to put this another way, why is it that Žižek's and Rothman’s 
contentions that we must see our own gaze on the screen only work within a 
context in which we also do not? Why is this supposedly anti-ideological 
gesture only possible within a certain ideology?  
In order to answer these questions, we might turn to the third of the texts 
that we examine here: Joan Copjec’s ‘The Invention of Crying and the 
Antitheatrics of the Act’ from her collection Imagine There’s No Woman.  
She begins her essay with a consideration of ‘female’ melodrama – the 
second half is a reading of Stella Dallas, along the lines of Rothman on 
Vertigo – which, following the pioneering scholarship of David Brooks’ The 
Melodramatic Imagination, she argues is an expression of a post-sacred 
world in which there are no transcendental values and God is inaccessible 
(we might translate this as saying that there is no longer anything outside of 
the symbolic order). Copjec, extending aspects of Brooks’ analysis, then 
makes a connection between the Hollywood melodramas of the 1930s to the 
1950s and a period of drama and painting in France around the mid-18th 
century, principally associated with the philosopher and playwright Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and the playwright and Salon critic Dennis Diderot. It is 
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Diderot who writes that the aim of painting – and it is something like this 
that Copjec argues will become the aim of Hollywood melodramas – is to 
move the spectator beyond words, to make them cry or cry out, as much in 
response to the felt inadequacy of language to express their emotions as to 
these emotions themselves. For Diderot, it is this crying that is the proper 
response to a work of art, and that comes before and perhaps even bears no 
final relationship to a considered response to the work. As he writes in his 
‘Notes on Painting’: ‘First touch me, astonish me, tear me apart, startle me, 
make me cry… you will please my eye afterward if you can’ (quoted in 
Copjec 2002, 109). 
To elaborate further the genealogy for melodrama that Brooks constructs, 
Copjec turns to Michael Fried, one of the foremost theorists of this period of 
art and a colleague of Cavell. In his Absorption and Theatricality: Painting 
and Beholder in the Age of Diderot, Fried seeks to give an account of the 
conditions that produce in the spectator this response of crying. For Fried, it 
is ‘absorption’, which arises out of the perception that the figures in the 
painting are unaware of being looked at by the spectator, that allows the 
spectator properly to respond properly to the work of art. By contrast, if the 
characters in the painting appear to be aware that the spectator is looking at 
them, or if the scene in the painting appears to be too obviously staged for 
the spectator, a kind of self-consciousness ensues, which Fried calls 
‘theatricality’ (quoted in Copjec 2002, 110-11). And in this ‘theatricality’, 
the spectator is not moved to cry, paradoxically because they are all too 
aware that the painting wants this response from them. It is a little like – to 
use Copjec’s analogy – an exhibitionist who deliberately reveals themselves 
in order to produce a reaction in the one who sees them. In fact, what this 
gesture produces in the spectator is only a feeling of ‘shame’ (Copjec 2002, 
128). It would be a shame on our part to be caught looking; but it would 
also be a shame for the other, insofar as they seem to be lacking, to need 
another to complete them in order to experience their own sexual pleasure.  
Copjec in her essay broadly agrees with Fried, but intriguingly – although 
not without precedent – aligns his analysis with that of Lacan. It is Lacan’s 
discourse on the gaze, contends Copjec, that might allow us to extend and 
think more exactly aspects of what Fried is saying. Thus it is not simply a 
matter of the characters in paintings or films not knowing that we are 
looking at them, but of us not showing them that we know that they know 
that we are looking at them. For example, with regard to Tintoretto’s 
painting of Susannah and the Elders (1555) that Diderot wrote about, it is 
hard not to make the case that Susannah deliberately reveals herself to us, 
that she is in effect an exhibitionist. However, the answer for Copjec is not 
that Susannah ‘does not know that we are looking at her’ but that ‘she 
knows but does not want us to show her we know’ (Copjec 2002, 113). In a 
sense, there is something like an unseen gaze here, something that sees us 
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without itself being seen or letting us look back at it. And we have a similar 
difficulty with those tableaux that Diderot argues for, which come together 
in a dramatic unity as though deliberately composed for the beholder’s eye. 
Here too the solution, in order to produce the impression that the scene the 
spectator comes upon is ‘found’ and not specifically intended to be seen by 
them, is that there must be ‘something that is unseen’ (Copjec 2002, 115) 
within the scene, a certain gaze that looks at us without us being able to see 
exactly where it originates. 
In other words, Copjec is suggesting that the effect of absorption Fried 
speaks of – the impression that the work of art or the figures within the 
work of art are unaware of being looked at – is possible only because of a 
certain gaze with which the work of art looks at us. In Copjec’s first 
example of Susannah and the Elders, it is not simply that Susannah is 
unaware of us, but that we are not able know that she knows she is being 
looked at. In her second example of the dramatic tableau, it is not merely 
that the scene cannot appear deliberately arranged for us, but that there must 
also be something else we cannot see that in a way looks at us. In both 
instances, what is revealed is not so much that the scene beheld is unaware 
of being seen or that the scene is not disposed for us to see, but that there 
must always be something else that is not seen, and it is this something else 
that produces the effect of absorption. Even though Susannah is aware of us 
looking, she must be able to appear unaware. Even though the scene is 
arranged to be seen by us, it must appear as though this is not so, insofar as 
there is something else in it that cannot be seen by us. It is this that gets us 
close to Copjec’s complex formula for the gaze, which she wants to suggest 
is a fitting expression of a world in which God is dead and there is nothing 
outside of the symbolic: ‘all-seeing, but not all-seen’ (Copjec 2002, 115). 
The world is us, is only our look upon it, but only because of a certain gaze 
we do not see. There is a look between us and the world in which we see 
everything and are entirely seen, but only because of a certain look upon us 
by the world. It is this paradoxical condition that makes possible the 
absorption Fried speaks of, and is the melodrama that Copjec attempts to 
analyse. 
Now, what does this have to do with Dumas’s ‘The Žižekian Thing’? How 
is all of this an answer to his accusation that film theorists like Žižek and 
Rothman deliberately overlook De Palma? That it is De Palma and not 
Hitchcock who has the answers to their questions? That it is De Palma who 
already does the critical work that they have to do for Hitchcock? Of course, 
one way of answering these questions – and this is an obvious aspect of 
their personae as film writers – is that Žižek and Rothman write only about 
films they like. In both of their writings – Žižek on a ‘theoretical’ level, 
Rothman on a more ‘existential’ level – it is always a matter of identifying 
with the film, or at least the characters within it. (Žižek proposes the idea 
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that the viewer is Norman’s gaze, Rothman that he is Judy and Hitchcock.) 
Or to put all of this another way – and this is really the point of our long 
detour through Copjec – they write only about films in which they are 
absorbed, which move them, which, we might even want to say, without 
being too melodramatic, make them want to cry. 
It is obvious that De Palma’s films fail to do this for either writer. And this 
is perhaps not simply a question of taste or intellectual snobbery, or 
whatever it is that Dumas accuses Žižek and Rothman of. Rather, it is 
because the intellectual operations in De Palma’s films are too obviously 
apparent, by which we mean that in them we can see the gaze, that the 
characters are aware of being looked at by us, that we are in no doubt about 
our interpretive hypotheses. (It would be exactly the kind of doubt that 
would mean Rothman putting his reading forward only as a hypothesis or 
Žižek featuring two opposed readings of the gaze in his essay on Hitchcock 
or, indeed, has Dumas admitting that for all of his criticism of Žižek he still 
remains thoroughly Žižekian (Dumas 2011, 246).) To say all of this 
otherwise, both Žižek and Rothman prefer films in which not only do they 
see themselves on the screen while the characters are not aware of being 
seen by them, but also in which they are looked at by the film although the 
origins of the film's gaze remain unknown. 
But perhaps all of this needs to be slowed down and elaborated in more 
detail. To go back to Rothman’s original hypothesis: if what is at stake in 
the sequence he looks at is Judy revealing to Scottie that she was involved 
in the murder of Madeleine, why does she not simply tell him? And, 
equally, if Scottie upon seeing Madeleine’s jewels is convinced that Judy 
did it, why does he not directly confront her? Why this distance that seems 
unable to be crossed? To borrow Copjec’s categories, we would say that 
both Judy cannot explicitly show Scottie her jewels or exhibit herself to 
him, and Scottie for his part cannot let her know that he has seen her 
showing them to him. This is the price they (and the film) pay for remaining 
in an ‘absorptive’ or ‘melodramatic’ relationship. And how much more 
dramatically effective this non-revelation is. Judy’s actions (for all of 
Scottie’s certainty that she was involved in the killing) would not have had 
the same impact if Scottie simply knew that she meant to show him her 
jewels. And equally, we are tempted to say, if Scottie had simply told Judy 
what he knew when he knew it, he would not have been able to drive her to 
the belltower, where she must know (but without being certain) that he 
knows (for there is an equal and opposite question raised by Rothman’s 
analysis: does Judy think that Scottie’s drive to the Mission is accidental or 
intended?). 
In a way, that is, the jewel in the final sequence operates as a stand-in for 
the gaze. It is the means through which Scottie and Judy communicate, 
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although it can never be seen or possessed by either of them. And it is what 
sees or allows us to see the characters, the mechanism through which they 
are revealed or reveal themselves. (We have an instance of this structure of 
vision in the dream sequence in the film when it is the jewels that appear to 
see within Scottie, revealing his deepest fears and insecurities.) To put this 
another way, there is a wonderful sense in this final sequence that, although 
they are both looking at each other, there is something hidden in each of 
them that the other does not see. She does not see him looking at her and he 
is not able to tell her that he knows that she knows he is looking at her 
(which is also implied by the fact that, for all of Scottie’s certainty that she 
was involved in the murder and even deliberately shows him the jewels to 
tell him that, he is not directly able to look at her looking at him but can do 
so only through a mirror). 
It is this reticence, this inability to see or say it all, that we find even in such 
loquacious film interpreters as Rothman and Žižek. Not only does Rothman 
put forward his theory that Judy knows what she is doing only as a 
hypothesis, to be considered alongside the possibility that she does not, but 
he also considers the possibility that his conviction in what he is saying can 
be proved only through doubt, and remains only insofar as there is doubt. 
That is – and it is exactly in this sense that Cavell means it – ‘defeating 
scepticism’ does not mean eliminating it, but, as with Descartes, who of 
course is Cavell’s original inspiration, thinking it. And again, with Cavell’s 
notion of the ‘unknown woman,’ it is not a matter of knowing her, but rather 
of thinking her unknownness, thinking her as unknown. It is this 
unknowability that is opened up by Rothman’s hypothesis: not that he now 
knows Judy, but that he knows that she is unknown, that he can never 
finally know her. And that if he is able to identify with her unknownness, it 
is not that he can now know himself, but that he can in some way know 
himself through (not) knowing her, through knowing her unknownness. In 
other words, Judy constitutes a kind of limit to Rothman; but a limit, almost 
in a dialectical sense – and, of course, the relationship of Cavell’s notion of 
the ‘unknown woman’ to Hegel’s feminine ‘irony’ would be well worth 
exploring – against which Rothman measures himself. As Rothman writes 
in ‘Scottie’s Dream’: 
Nor had it dawned on me to ask myself why I resisted questioning the 
assumption – an assumption, and a resistance, common to all who 
have written about the film – that Judy cannot be conscious of wishing 
for Scottie to know the truth. Evidently, I believed I knew this woman 
better than she knew herself. Evidently, I did not know that I wished to 
believe this. How could I not have known this about myself? 
(Rothman 2013) 
We see the same ambiguity with Žižek. It is perhaps too easy to understand 
his project as a breaking of our identification with the gaze, exposing the 
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fact that the fathomless gaze of Norman in Psycho is simply ours upon him. 
This is perhaps true, but the real questions are how we attain this realisation, 
and within what larger ideological structure is it possible For just as the 
Lacanian analyst must work through the analysand’s transference, this 
insight is not to be attained directly but only through a prior identification 
with Norman. (Again, it is exactly this ability to transfer onto Hitchcock’s 
characters that marks one of the differences between his films and De 
Palma’s, and it is in this sense that Hitchcock’s cinema has multiple 
ideological possibilities that De Palma’s cinema does not.) Or, to put this 
more generally, in what context does Žižek’s ‘anti-ideological’ reading of 
films and cultural objects exist? Not outside of ideology, but only within it 
and as an effect of it. The ‘empty’ gaze of Norman on to us and of us onto 
Norman in Psycho can be seen only against a wider ‘ignorant’ gaze, or a 
gaze of which we must be kept ignorant, which is that of the social order 
itself.6 (And even within the epic narrative trajectory of Hitchcock – The 
Murderous Gaze, it is the case that the reduced world of Psycho does not 
entirely break with and is only a subset within the larger world of something 
like The Thirty-Nine Steps Steps.) It is this mutual dependency that is the 
‘Moebius band’ that connects the ‘Name of the Father’ and the ‘desire of 
the Mother’ in Žižek’s analysis of Psycho in ‘In His Bold Gaze My Ruin Is 
Writ Large’ (Žižek 1992, 226-9). 
So what then happens at the end of Vertigo after Judy reveals to Scottie that 
she was involved in the murder of Madeleine and Scottie realises this? 
Again, we might turn to Copjec’s ‘The Invention of Crying’ for an answer. 
In her analysis of Stella Dallas, as part of her elaboration of the Lacanian 
formulae of sexuation and the conception of woman as ‘not all’ within the 
symbolic order, Copjec makes the point that the last shot of the film needs 
to be read differently than is usually the case. The concluding sequence of 
the film, in which Stella looks on unseen from the street at the wedding of 
her daughter taking place inside Mrs Morrison’s house is generally 
                                                      
6That is, it is absolutely crucial to realise that Žižek presents not one but two approaches to 
the gaze in ‘‘In His Bold Gaze My Ruin is Writ Large’’. On the one hand, there is the 
classic set-up of ideological interpellation, in which we have ‘the illusion that the Other 
always-already looks at us, addresses us’, when this is only a retrospective effect of our 
own recognition (Žižek 1992, 224). On the other hand, there is the Other who has us 
believe that we were not chosen when it stages its spectacle ‘with an eye to our gaze’, when 
in fact we have been chosen (Žižek 1992, 225). In the first, we are mistaken in our belief 
that the Other has chosen us, and the gaze is just an effect of our looking for it. In the 
second, we are mistaken in our belief that the Other has not chosen us when it actually has, 
and the gaze already sees us. And Žižek does not choose between these two approaches 
because both are necessary to explain the increasingly complex ways in which ideology 
currently operates. It is through our belief that we have not been chosen, our supposed 
distance from the ideological interpellation of the Other, that we are chosen (the first 
alternative is possible only because of the second); and the realisation that we are not 
chosen, our distance from the interpellation of the Other, is attained only by first believing 
that we have been chosen (the second alternative is possible only because of the first). 
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understood as Stella ‘withdrawing’ from the world, either negatively in a 
gesture of masochistic sacrifice, or positively in some conception of the 
‘unknown woman’. And Copjec extends this essentially ‘hysterical’ (Copjec 
2002, 125) conception of woman by suggesting that it might be possible that 
Stella plans to marry off not only her daughter to Mrs Morrison’s son, but 
also her ex-husband to Mrs Morrison herself. As though to make up for 
some inherent lack of masculine potency or some deficiency in the symbolic 
order, Stella works behind the scenes to bring male and female together and 
provide some kind of ground or limit to the essential contingency of a world 
without God. 
But Copjec breaks with this reading of Stella’s behaviour by suggesting that 
in this final sequence, exactly as an expression of the ‘feminine’ nature of 
melodrama, Stella does not back away and withdraw from the world. 
Rather, in the very last shot of the film, she strides triumphantly and full of 
a kind of feminine jouissance off-screen and into a new and unknown space, 
inaccessible to the spectator. Stella here is not outside of the symbolic, as 
the exception that makes it possible, but operates as kind of exception 
within the symbolic, at once a self-sacrificing woman and ‘something else 
besides’ (Copjec 2002, 127).  
We see something similar in the last sequence of Vertigo. For Rothman asks 
the question in the course of his analysis, what is it that Judy wants to be 
recognised as? In a way, neither as Judy nor Madeleine, but as the actress 
behind both of them. As a kind of ‘unknown woman’ who is somehow 
behind the symbolic and pulls the strings of masculine desire. Indeed, we 
might even say that, like Stella, Judy sacrifices herself in order to reunite 
Scottie with his ideal woman, and does this because she knows that 
masculine power is a myth, but one that cannot be publicly exposed. 
However, as with the jewel sequence, it could also be said that Judy does 
not want to remain as unknown.7 And that, against a certain reading of 
melodrama, the belltower scene in which Scottie and the now fully-revealed 
Judy cling to each other and profess their love is precisely that love or 
encounter that has otherwise been denied throughout the rest of the film 
(Madeleine asleep as Scottie takes her clothes off in his flat towards the 
                                                      
7 This point is nevertheless complicated (and contestable). Certainly, Copjec’s essay is 
indebted to aspects of Rothman’s ‘Pathos and Transfiguration in the Face of the Camera: A 
Reading of Stella Dallas’ (Rothman 2004). And certainly Rothman breaks with the usual 
reading of Stella Dallas as a story of Stella’s sacrifice or self-sacrifice for ‘something’ 
(Rothman 2004, 93). Rather, he suggests that the lesson of the film is that ‘acts of sacrifice 
bring their own rewards’ (Rothman 2004, 92). Copjec's reading echoes Rothman's 
interpretation in stating that ‘the end of the film is no longer about giving something up, 
about maternal sacrifice, but about giving, or maternal love, about the creative act in which 
one gives precisely nothing’ (Copjec 2002, 127). But in Rothman’s emphasis on the 
‘secret’ (Rothman 2004, 92) aspect of Stella’s smile at the end of the film, with all of its 
obvious associations with Cavell’s ‘unknown woman’, it is arguable that we still have the 
logic of a certain retreat or withdrawal from the world. 
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beginning of the film, the cut before they make love in her hotel room 
towards the end of the film, and even the scene with the jewels immediately 
following). 
But at the very moment when Scottie and Judy embrace passionately in full 
recognition of one other, Judy is also not there. And this is the true meaning 
of melodrama for Copjec. It is not that love is impossible or does not take 
place, but that when it does take place it is experienced as impossible: ‘I 
loved you so!’ And this is to say that for Copjec it is all we have been 
meaning by speaking of the way that Scottie and Judy are not directly able 
to speak to or see one another – love is not so much the coming together of 
two but of ‘one and a’ (Copjec 2002, 130).  It is this that we see at the end 
of Vertigo when Scottie no sooner kisses Judy than she steps away, leaving 
him alone again. Rothman asks in ‘Scottie’s Dream’, why is it that Judy has 
to die? And, of course, the usual reason, which Rothman in a way echoes, is 
that feminine jouissance has to be socialised to maintain the symbolic order, 
as embodied by the nun. But, in another way – to propose perhaps an 
equally outrageous hypothesis to Rothman’s – what would it mean to 
suggest that Judy does not die at the end of Vertigo? That, like Stella at the 
end of Stella Dallas, she rather steps into another space, off-screen but not 
outside of the symbolic order, almost like a ghost or a spirit? Certainly, we 
never see her body at the end of the film. And – to attempt to flesh out, as it 
were, Copjec’s idea of the encounter occurring not between two but 
between one and a – we have at the end of Vertigo exactly that situation she 
speaks of as produced by the prohibition of a mutual look between the 
subject of a painting and its beholder: on the one side, a ‘self-sufficient, 
realistic and moving’ world; on the other, not the simple ignorance or 
obliteration of the beholder, but the beholder as their jouissance (Copjec 
2002, 130). For is it not this that we see in that final shot of Vertigo, as the 
camera rises up over the belltower and the bells ring out? Is it not Judy 
living on, not excluding herself from this world but inhabiting another 
space? And are not these bells the sound not of her repression but of her 
jouissance? It is an insight that would have to wait some 40 years to be 
realised in another great ‘melodrama of the unknown woman’: Lars von 
Trier’s Breaking the Waves (1996), which in its final shot features bells 
ringing out, a point-of-view from the sky and the jouissance of a woman 
who has not simply sacrificed herself for a man, but is in another space 
entirely. 
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